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THE MANAGEMENT OF HUNTING 

LEASES BY RURAL LANDOWNERS 

By John K. Thomas, Clark E. Adams 

And John F. Thigpen I11 

ABSTRACT 
Most of the land in Texas is privately owned and is an important as a source 
for hunting recreation. Profit maximization theory (PMT) and economic 
behavioral theory (EBT) were used to explain differences in the net incomes 
of Texas landowners who sold hunting leases during the 1989-90 hunting 
season. In 1990,4,621 landowners who were licensed to sell hunting leases 
by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department responded to a mail survey. 
Findings indicated that the statewide median net lease income was $1,100, 
few landowners considered their leasing operations as businesses, and few 
practiced intensive management of their operations. Number of acres leased 
had the most important effect on net lease income. Findings supported 
aspects of both PMT and EBT. 
INTRODUCTION 
Hunting has an important economic impact on many rural areas 
affecting land values (Pope et al. 1984), the flow of goods and 
services from rural communities to hunters (Steinhoff et al. 1987), and 
the provision of alternative sources of income for landowners, 
particularly those involved in agriculture (Steinbach et 
al. 1987). 
Private landowners control access to almost 95 percent of the land in 
the rural South (Knowles 1989; White 1987). They can sell leases or 
invite hunters t  use th ir land for hunting. 
John K. Thomas and Clark E. Adams are associate professors and John F. Thigpen 111 is an assistant professor and Extension specialist in the 
Department of Rural Sociology at Texas A&M University. A version of 
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Fee access has been a traditional practice for approximately one 
of every three hunters. Although the advantages and disadvantages of 
fee or lease hunting (Guynn and Schmidt 1984; Monill 1987) and the 
demand side of lease hunting (Bergstrom and Cordell 1991; Langner 
1988; Messonier and Luzar 1990; Pope and Stoll 1985; Wright 1985) 
have been well discussed, studies of the supply side, specifically 
landowners and their activities that affect lease income, have been 
limited (Messonier and Luzar 1990; Steinbach et al. 1987; Wright 
1985). 
In this study, we examined the leasing behavior of Texas 
landowners and how their behaviors affected net lease income. It has 
been estimated that more $100 million is spent annually on leases to 
access game species for hunting in Texas, producing a total annual 
value of wildlife that ranges from $100 million to $300 million when 
other spending by hunters is considered (Pope et al. 1984). How rural 
landowners manage their lease operations affects both this recreational 
market and the quality of habitat and game species that attract hunters. 
Texas Hunting Leases 
Regulation of the selling of Texas hunting leases on private lands 
began in 1925. Since then, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department 
(TPWD) annually has sold hunting-lease licenses to private 
landowners, hunting clubs, corporations, and other groups. A license 
permits a landowner or operator to legally sell hunting leases to the 
public. A landowner is required by state law to purchase a license for 
each parcel of land designated for lease hunting. License fees vary 
according to the number of acres to be leased -- $15 for less than 500 
acres, $40 for 500 to 1,000 acres, and $60 for more than 1,000 acres. 
Hunting clubs, or cooperatives, pay $60 for a license, regardless of the 
number of acres involved. 
The types of leases sold vary by time and other conditions. There 
are generally three types of time-based leases. The first two and most 
common in Texas are annual and seasonal leases. With these leases, a 
landowner provides to a hunter or group of hunters the right to hunt 
for a full year, or for a particular hunting season. Such leases often 
allow hunters to hunt several game species. The seasonality of a hunt 
involving particular game species is regulated by the TPWD. With 
2
Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 10 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol10/iss1/4
Thomas et al. 
annual and seasonal leases, hunters and landowners negotiate what 
services and facilities are to be provided by the landowner and what 
hunters may do to improve hunting conditions on the land. For 
example, a landowner may not provide cold storage facilities yet will 
allow hunters to place these facilities at a campsite. The other type of 
time-based lease is day-hunting. In this arrangement, a landowner 
permits a hunter access to game species on the land on a per-day basis. 
This short-term arrangement is usually limited only to right of ingress 
without provision of services or facilities (Thomas et al. 1989; 
Grarnann 1986). 
In 
addition to the time condition of a lease, a landowner can base 
a lease on the number of hunters and groups, number of acres, and 
types of animals to be harvested. Leases sold by the "gun" refers to the 
number of individual hunters allowed to hunt at a specified time (i.e., 
annually, seasonally, or daily). A landowner who sells leases to 
outfitters and to recreational or sports clubs permits these groups to 
assume most of the responsibility for managing hunting activity on the 
land. An acre-based lease is self-explanatory. Leases based on the 
animal to be "bagged" or harvested during a hunting season may differ 
according to the number, sex, size, antler development, and other 
characteristics of the game. A derivation of this type of lease 
involves the hunting of exotic game which has been imported and 
bred in private hunting preserves. Exotic game in Texas include 
several species of deer (e.g., axis, sika, and fallow), aoudad sheep, 
blackbuck and nilgai antelope, and elk. Landowners generally sell an 
exotic game lease on a single or trophy-kill basis. 
Study Model 
Our model was based on two economic theories. Least-cost or 
profit-maximization theory (PMT) explains some landowners' 
management and lease practices by pointing to landowners' motives of 
profit maximization (Obrinsky 1983; Shackle 1970). PMT states that 
landowners who sell hunting leases will seek to minimize their costs 
by providing a minimal number of inputs such as facilities and 
services. By keeping expenses low, landowners can charge lease fees 
that are mainly determined by hunter demand and competition among 
local lease operators. Conversely, they attempt to maximize profits by 
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providing short-term (e.g., game processing) and long-term (e.g., 
cabins and walk-in coolers) multiple inputs and intensely manage their 
leases to compete for and serve a socioeconomically upscale hunter 
clientele in some markets. PMT assumes that all landowners are 
rational and behave similarly and that external market factors, such as 
game regulations, affect each landowner equally (Heap 1989; 
Polkinghorn 1979). 
Economic behavioral theory (EBT) originated with Gabriel 
Tarde's La Psychologie Economique (1902) in which he proposed that 
economic decision making is affected by personal and non-economic 
motives, incomplete and inaccurate use of information, and 
uncertainty (March and Sevon 1988). Rural landowners possess 
different natural resource-related values and information processing 
abilities, which can also influence their decision making (Warneryd 
1988). Many landowners are not always driven by profit-making 
motives when they decide to lease or not to lease their land to hunters 
(Brown et al., 1984; Kaiser and Wright, 1985). Because of these 
factors, sorting out landowner' decisions to or not to sell and manage 
hunting leases is difficult and complex. 
In our study, we expected to find landowners who sold hunting 
leases for profits and for non-economic reasons. We assessed the 
extent to which rural landowners treated their lease activities as 
businesses in two distinctive ecoregions of Texas. We expected to 
find the number of management practices conducted on hunting leases 
positively affected leasing activities and net incomes. Texas was 
selected because it has one of the largest private lease systems in the 
United States (Wiggers and Rootes 1987; Wright 1985), one of the 
most diverse ecoystems (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1979). and 
one of the largest populations of private landowners (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 1990). 
By examining lease-related behaviors we were able to apply the 
two theories to explain variations in net incomes derived from the sale 
of hunting leases. We tested the following hypotheses. 
Hypotheses Za-c: (a) Ecological region, (b) years of 
operation, and (c) operational status postively aflect the 
number of management practices of landowners, the acreages 
leased, the numbers of hunters who fee-access hunted, and 
landowners net income. 
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Ecological Region. Few studies have examined the effect of 
ecological diversity on hunting (Messonier and Luzar, 1990). 
Although white-tailed deer hunting is popular statewide, we used two 
major ecological regions (West Texas = 1, East Texas = 0) to indicate 
variations in habitat and hunting conditions (U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service 1979). East Texas represents 79 counties located in the 
Pineywoods, Gulf Prairies and Post Oak Savannah ecosystems. These 
systems are characterizied by pine and hardwood forests, rolling hills 
and marshes. West Texas represents 179 counties located in the South 
Texas Plains, Edwards Plateau, Rolling Plains, High Plains and Trans 
Pecos ecosystems. West Texas is semi-arid and has escarpment, 
savannah and prairie types of terrain. Landowners in this region 
operate on average larger farms and ranches than in East Texas and in 
some areas, for example Llano County, they have replaced cattle 
ranching with the more profitable sale of hunting leases. 
Consequently, we expected to find that West-Texas landowners were 
more entrepreneurial than East-Texas landowners by more actively 
managing lease acreages, leasing more acres to hunters, selling leases 
to more hunters, providing free access to fewer hunters, and producing 
more net income from the sale of hunting leases. 
Years of Operation. Past research is unclear about the effect of 
years of operation on the number management practices enacted, 
leasing behaviors and the amount of earned lease income. Steinbach 
and his colleagues (1987) reported that the longer a landowner 
operates a lease, the more likely he will make and accumulate 
investments to improve game conditions and to provide services and 
facilities to hunters. Their findings would support PMT. However, 
Wright (1985) provided evidence supporting EBT when he found that 
landowners older than 59 years of age were more likely than younger 
landowners in six Texas counties to be apprehensive about the public 
hunting on their land, to post their land for trepass, and to allow only 
friends and relatives to hunt. The difference in the these studies' 
findings may be that the former study was conducted in West Texas 
and the latter was conducted in East Texas. Both studies were limited 
to small geographical areas. In our statewide study, landowners were 
asked to report the number of years their hunting leases had been in 
operation. We expected to find results similar Steinbach et al. and to 
show that older operations had a larger leasing clientele, fewer 
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free-access hunters, and more net income. 
Operational Status. A landowners' perception of his lease 
operation is an important indicator of his motive for leasing to 
hunters. Landowners were asked to indicate if they operated their 
hunting leases as business enterprises (yes = 1, no = 0 ). Respondents 
who considered their operations to be businesses would be more likely 
than other landowners to make needed investments and provide 
services to enhance profits by the sale of more and higher fee leases to 
hunters. However, cost control is also an important factor that affects 
profit margins. Landowners could view the sale of hunting leases as a 
low input enterprise to produce supplemental income. These 
landowners would be less likely to manage wildlife resources and 
provide services and facilities, to lease large numbers of acres to 
hunters, and to provide free-access to hunters in order to make a profit 
(Steinbach et al. 1987; Pope and Stoll 1985). 
Hypotheses 2a,b: The number of (a) management practices 
of landowners and (b) the number of acres leased to hunters 
positively affect the number of fee-access hunters and 
landowners' net income. They negatively affect the number 
of free-access hunters. 
Management Practices. According to PMT, landowners who 
intensively manage game and habitat to improve hunting conditions 
have more fee-access hunters, fewer free-access hunters, and earn 
more net income than other landowners. Landowners who earn little 
or no income have no financial incentive to manage their resources 
and provide services, unless they do so for personal reasons, according 
to EBT. Landowners and hunters can also negotiate the number and 
types of services to be included in a hunting lease (Thomas et al., 
1989). Although the provision of services and facilities may not 
significantly contribute to higher lease fees and incomes because of 
competitive market conditions and the long-term investment in and 
accumulation of facilities (Messonier and Luzar 1990; Pope and Stoll 
1985), it could negatively effect operational expenses and net lease 
income, particularly for a start-up operation. PMT would predict a 
positive effect by management activity on the number of fee-access 
hunters and net income. Unlike EBT, it would predict a negative 
effect on the number of free-access hunters 
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Landowners indicated which of 10 management techniques (yes = 
1, no = 0) they used in their 1989-90 lease operation: planted food 
plots; fed wildlife; conducted a wildlife census; maintained check 
stations; conducted sex and age counts of wildlife; fallow plowed; 
constructed high fences; managed tanks and ponds; controlled harvests 
of game; and controlled brush. Landowners further reported which of 
a series of services and facilities they provided to hunters (yes = 1, no 
= 0). Seven services which could have been provided during the 
1989-90 hunting season were: hunting guides; game processing; 
filling game feeders; food service to hunters; delivery of hunters to 
hunting stands; maps of hunting areas; and publishing a newsletter. 
Ten types of facilities included: hunting blinds; game feeders; landing 
strip; cabin; kitchen; bathroom/showers; utilities; trailer hook-ups; 
walk-in coolers; and shooting range. An index score was created from 
the sum of each landowner's responses to the three series of questions. 
Scores varied from 0 to 27. 
Number of Acres Leased to Hunters. The purchase of a license 
by a landowner to sell hunting leases does not necessarily have to 
result in the sale of a hunting lease nor does a landowner have to lease 
all of the acres for which the license was purchased. According to 
PMT, a landowner would lease all or most of his land licensed for the 
1989-90 hunting season to maximize profit. EBT would indicate a 
less optimal leasing behavior by licensed owners who would allow a 
large number of free-access hunters to access their land. Research has 
shown that size of operation is the primary variable positively 
correlated with gross lease income and that larger lease operations 
generally have more expenses (Messonier and Luzar 1990; Pope and 
Stoll 1985; Steinbach et al. 1987). 
Hypotheses 3a,b: The number of fee-access hunters positively 
affects landowners' net incomes, while the number of 
free-access hunters has an opposite effect. 
Numbers of Fee- and Free-access Hunters. According to PMT, 
landowners who sell more leases to hunters should produce more net 
income than other landowners, when resource investment and acreage 
are controlled. In contrast to PMT, EBT proposes that landowners, in 
addition to selling leases, provide free huntinf access to friends, 
business associates, and relatives. Large numbers of free-access 
7
Thomas et al.: The Management of Hunting Leases By Rural Landowners
Published by eGrove, 1994
62 Southern Rural Sociology 
hunters would negatively affect a landowner's net income by making 
less land safely available to fee-access hunters. We determined the 
number of fee-access hunters by adding a landowner's responses to 
two questions: "How many hunters paid for leases and live in Texas?" 
and "How many hunters paid for leases and live outside of Texas?" 
The number of free-access hunters was measured by the question, 
"How many hunters, who used this hunting lease, hunted for free?" 
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable of the model was 
net lease income. Operational expense was measured by the question, 
"What were your operating expenses on this hunting lease this 
season?" Space limitations of the survey questionnaire did not allow a 
detailed enumeration of the types and amounts of these expenses. 
Lease income was determined by a series of questions that asked how 
much income the landowner realized from the sale of leases by the 
gun, number of acres, groups, and animal (exotics). Incomes from 
these types of leases were summed to calculate a total income for each 
landowner. Net lease income was calculated by substracting lease 
expenses from total income. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
When landowners purchased a license from the TPWD, they 
completed an application form providing current mailing address 
information. The 1989-90 list of 12,363 licensees was obtained from 
the TPWD. A two-page questionnaire was developed for machine 
scanning and mailed in January 1990 to each licensee. A second 
questionnaire and post-card to nonrespondents followed two weeks 
after the first mailing. Licensees with multiple licenses (6% of all 
applicants) were telephoned to ensure that a questionnaire was 
completed for each licensed operation. Overall, 60 percent (n = 
7,399) responded to the survey. Among this group, 62 percent (n = 
4,621) reported being a landowner and having actually operated a 
lease during the 1989-90 hunting season; 20 percent were 
non-landowners; and 18 percent did not operate leases or derive 
income from lease sales. The total list of licensees accounted for 
33,769,623 acres in Texas. Licensees who responded to the survey 
and operated leases during the 1989-90 season sold hunting leases 
involving 11,764,896 acres (Adams et al. 1992). 
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We tested our hypotheses by applying the multiple regression 
procedure and comparing standardized regression coefficients. 
Adjusted R-square coefficients were reported to indicate the total 
amounts of variation explained by the independent variables in each of 
five regression models. We assessed multicollinearity by examining 
the magnitude of bivariate correlations and by calculating variable 
tolerances (i.e., subtracting the squared multiple correlation for each 
independent variable regressed against the other independent variables 
from one). Correlation values were less than .600 and tolerance 
values were above .700. A large correlation coefficient and a 
tolerance value less than .001 would indicate multicollinearity. 
Overall, our results indicated no multicollinear problems among the 
data. 
FINDINGS 
Descriptive Results 
Table 1 reports descriptive results for the study variables. The 
majority of respondents (82%) owned land in West Texas. Statewide, 
licensed landowners had averaged operating leases almost 16 years; 
however, only 15 percent operated their leases as businesses. They 
averaged using 5 management practices, although 11 percent reported 
using none. Lease sizes averaged 2,546 acres, compared with the 
median of 566 acres. Landowners generally permitted more fee than 
free access to hunters. They sold leases to an average of 14 hunters, 
compared with a mean of 3 hunters who were granted free access. 
Seven percent sold no leases which indicated that they had negotiated 
other arrangements with hunters, such as free-access or land 
stewardship (i.e., hunters permitted to hunt if they provided their 
facilities or managed the habitat and game). Sixty percent of the 
landowners did not allow free access. Overall, landowners averaged 
earning $4,579 in net income, compared with a median of $1,500. 
Fifteen percent reported net losses. 
Multiple regression results are reported in Table 2. Standardized 
regression coefficients equal to or greater than .028 were statistically 
significant, although low coefficients theoretically were not important. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Results of a Survey of Texas Landowners 
Licensed to Sell Hunting Leases During the 1989-90 
Hunting Season 
Variables Percent Mean Standard 
(# of respondents) Deviation 
Region East Texas 17.9 
(4,46 1) West Texas 82.1 
Years of operationa less than 5 22.1 
(4,498) 5 to 10 29.7 
11 or more 48.2 
15.73 14.34 
Business Status no (0) 84.9 
(4,621) yes (1) 15.1 
Number of none 11.1 
management 1 to 3 10.4 
practicesa 4 t o 6  37.4 
(4,621) 7 to 9 27.0 
10 or more 14.1 
4.98 4.23 
Number of 1 to 249 21 .O 
leased acresa 250 to 499 25.5 
(4,621) 500 to 999 19.6 
loOo+ 33.9 
2,546 8,187 
Number of none 7.0 
fee-access huntersa 1 to 4 30.4 
(4,621) 5 to 9 31.0 
10 to 14 12.8 
15 or more 18.8 
Number of none 60.0 
free-access huntersa 1 to 4 23.7 
(4.621) 5 to 9 9.7 
10 to 14 3.5 
15 or more 3.1 
10
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Table 1, continued 
Variables Percent Mean Standard 
(# of respondents) Deviation 
Net lease incomea none/loss 14.6 
(4,449) $1 to 999 24.1 
1,000- 1,999 19.4 
2,0004,999 22.6 
$5,OOo+ 19.3 
$4,579 $15,860 
a Categories are for presentation only 
The first model explained 15 percent of the variation in landowners' 
use of management practices (X4). As predicted, landowners who had 
operations in West Texas operated leases the longest, and considered 
their operations as businesses used more management practices. 
Operational/business status (beta = .345) had the most important effect 
on the number of management practices used. 
The model for number of acres leased was less successful, 
explaining only three percent of the variation in lease acres. Business 
status had the only statistically significant beta (.171). Results for 
region and years of operation differed from expectations; neither 
variable was statistically significant. Size of leases were similar in 
both regions of the state and among starting and older operations. 
The third model explained almost 27 percent of the variation in 
the number of fee-access hunters (X6). Contrary to our hypotheses, 
landowners in West Texas leased to fewer hunters (beta = -.125) and 
the number of management practices had no effect (beta = .011) on the 
number of fee-access hunters. These results may have occurred 
because West Texas has more landowners competing for smaller pool 
of hunters. The region has a lower population density (i.e., larger land 
area relative to population size) and higher concentration of 
nonhunting Hispanics than does East Texas (Murdock et al., 1990). 
As we expected in our other hypotheses, the number of leased acres 
produced the largest effect (beta = .480), while number of operating 
years and business status had low, positive (betas < .100) and 
statistically significant effects. 
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Table 2. Standardized coefficients produced by the regression of 
Texas landowners' (n = 4,621) net leasing income on the 
characteristics of their hunting lease operations in 1990. 
Dependent Variablee 
Independent X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 
Variables 
Region (XI) .14gC .014 -Uc -.046~ D2.3 
- dummy 
Years of (X2) .095C gSrS .028a .046~ -m 
operation 
Business (X3) .345C .17lc .08gC .028a .09gC 
status 
- dummy 
Management (X4) .011 .103C . 037~  
practices 
Number of (X5) .480C .032a .510C 
leased acres 
Number of (X6) -ma 
fee-access 
hunters 
Number of (X7) Ax! 
free-access 
hunters 
Net lease (x8) --- 
income 
Adjusted .I55 .029 .268 .018 .304 
R-Square 
F-Value 276.4fdd 45.638d 330.768~ 17.872~ 272.230~ 
a Prob. > I t l was .05 
Prob. > I t l was .Ol 
Prob. > l t l was ,001 
Prob. > F was .0001, with 4,497 degrees of freedom for each 
equation, except for the net income equation, which had 4,352 degrees 
of freedom. 
Underlined coefficients were not as predicted by the research 
hypothesis 
12
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The fourth model explained only two percent of the differences in 
the numbers of free-access hunters (X7). Although all the betas were 
statistically significant in the direction predicted, none was greater 
than .loo, except for the number of management practices (beta = 
.103). Land-owners who used a larger number of management 
practices had leased to more fee-access hunters. Fee-access and 
free-access variables had a low, but statistically significant correlation 
(r = .081). 
The final model explained 30 percent of the variation in net lease 
income. Contrary to our hypotheses, the effects by region and 
numbers of operating years and free-access hunters were not 
statistically significant. Also, the statisticially significant negative 
effect by the number of fee-access hunters (beta = -.028) on net lease 
income was in the opposite direction predicted. Most of the explained 
variation resulted from number of leased acres (beta = .510) and 
business status (beta = .099). Landowners who regarded their 
operations as businesses and who leased large numbers of acres 
produced the most net income. 
DISCUSSION 
Private landowners control access to the majority of game species 
and land resources in Texas (Adams et al. 1992). Economic principles 
of supply and demand suggest that profit is often emphasized as the 
incentive for landowners to develop and sell hunting leases. Well 
managed lease acreages produce higher quality habitats and game, 
pariticularly white-tailed deer, and stimulate more hunter demand for 
access to such areas. Increased hunter demand and a finite resource 
supply thus should produce higher lease fees. If this scenario holds, 
we should have observed more landowners treating their lease 
operations as businesses, practicing more management, and obtaining 
greater net incomes from the sale of hunting lease than we did. 
Overall, the typical lease operation in Texas was less formalized 
and entreprenurial than we had expected, given the maturity of the 
Texas leasing system. Most of the landowners appeared to take an 
informal, nonbusiness approach to operating and selling hunting 
leases. Other results in our study indicated that almost 29 percent of 
the landowners statewide did not consider the license fee paid to sell 
13
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hunting leases to be an operational expense. Further, only 13 percent 
viewed their operations as business enterprises, slightly more than half 
applied fewer than 5 of 27 possible management practices, and a large 
segment (40%) provided free access to hunters. Free-land access by 
hunters could dampen lease demand and the amount charged by other 
landowners for leases. 
Our findings lent support to both the profit maximization 
explanation and the economic behavioral explanation of landowners' 
lease operations. Many landowners might have regarded the sale of 
hunting leases as a "sugar jar" source of supplementing their incomes 
rather than pure profit maximizing enterprise. Intensive management 
of lease operations would have required large investments of time and 
money and greater risks of failure to recoup costs (March and Sevon 
1988). By limiting their inputs to the provision of a small number of 
management practices, primarily practices that sustain wildlife game 
resources, landowners had lower investment risks and more profit 
margins, if not the most profits, resulting from the sale of hunting 
leases. Some social scientists would argue that this practice is the 
essence of profit maximization behavior (Heap 1989; Obrinsky 1983; 
Shackel 1970). 
A final factor is also worth noting about lease hunting in Texas. 
New programs by the TPWD and agencies in other states (Wigley and 
Melchiors 1987) can affect lease demand and how landowners provide 
resource access to hunters. For example, the TPWD instituted in 1987 
the Type I1 Wildlife Management Area Program. In lieu of selling 
hunting leases, many owners have turned to the TPWD to manage 
wildlife and habitat resources and to control hunting on their lands. 
The TPWD provides low cost hunting opportunities to the public by 
contracting with private landowners to manage a specified number of 
acres for hunting and for wildlife and habitat conservation. After the 
TPWD deducts administrative, law enforcement and wildlife 
management expenses from the sale of $35 annual permits to hunters, 
it pays each landowner a prorated share according to the number of 
hunter days spent on a owner's land. In 1989, approximately 3 1,000 
permits were sold to hunters providing access to 728,000 acres at 81 
sites in Texas (Thomas and Adams 1990-91). 
How rural, private landowners manage recreation-related natural 
resources is ecologically and economically important. Wildlife 
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resources belong to the commonweal and rural landowners are 
stewards of these resources. The results of this study imply the need 
to extend research on landowners' decision making regarding the 
management of these resources, integration of resource management 
with other land-use practices including farming and ranching, and 
their relationships with the consuming public. 
Endnotes 
1. Licensees who purchased a license but did not sell hunting leases 
accounted for 8,039,437 acres. Nonrespondents to the survey represented 
13,965,290 licensed acres. Further, in April, 1990, a random sample of 110 
nonrespondents was interviewed by telephone to estimate statistical bias in 
the survey. Sampling error was + 9 percent, based on the population of 
nonrespondents. Five questions were used to estimate nonresonse bias: (1) 
Was this hunting lease in operation during this hunting season? (2) Will this 
hunting lease be in operation next year? (3) What is your relationship (i.e., 
landowner, operator, outfitter, or hunter) to this hunting lease? (4) Did you 
derive any income from leasing? and (5) In what county is the majority of 
this lease located? Responses of this sample were compared with those of 
respondents to the the original survey and were tested using the chi square 
test. Findings indicated that nonrespondents were less likely than 
respondents to have operated leases during the 1989-90 hunting season, 
derived income from the sale of hunting leases during 1989-90, and planned 
to operate leases the next year. Both groups reported similar percentages of 
landowners. Finally, nonrespondents had licensed acres located in 51 of 254 
Texas counties. No ecological clustering of these counties was observed. 
Overall, these results suggested that nonrespondents were different from the 
respondents, whom we considered to have been bona fide lease operators. 
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